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Abstract   
This paper uses the Canadian industrial macro-level data from CANSIM to investigate the effect 
of formal and informal regulations on pollution intensity. Proxies for formal and informal 
regulation variables are defined as in Cole et al., 2005.  The econometrics model is a panel with 
23 manufacturing industries over 10 years, from 1994 to 2003. Manufacturing industries are 
chosen because they are the most pollutant industries. It is found that formal and informal 
regulations have significant effects on decreasing the direct and indirect greenhouse gas 
emissions in Canadian industries. Provinces with younger populations have stricter informal 
regulation on pollution density, because younger populations care more about the future quality 
of the environment. Also, provinces with a higher rate of unemployment have less formal 
regulation on pollution density; for those provinces, providing employment for citizens is more 
important than providing a healthy environment. Wealthier provinces with a low employment 
rate face less pressure from society and can spend more money on the environment; therefore, 
they have lower pollution density. Furthermore, industries with large average firm size can 
decrease emissions more than other industries. The cost of controlling the emissions decreases 
with firm size because of economies of scale. 
JEL classification: O13; L60; Q21; Q25; Q28 
Keywords: Canadian manufacturing industries; Air pollution; Environmental regulations 
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Introduction 
These days, people think about pollution more than many years ago. There are numerous 
incentives to decrease the pollution on earth; people need cleaner environment to live more and 
better. Environmental regulation is one way that is chosen by government to intervene in the 
market to decrease the amount of pollution. Some governments use pollution tax and some other 
use emission fees, or tradable permits system. After performing the regulation another question 
may arise. Which regulation’s instrument decrease more pollution? What is the effect of the 
regulation?  
Sometimes, environmental regulation does not achieve its target. For example, 
Schlottmann (1976) looked at the “national coal and sulfur emissions policies” in US and found 
out that regulation did not have any effect on pollution induction. Thus, it is important to insure 
the efficiency of environmental policies and regulation to decrease the possibility of failure to 
achieving our goals. To answer these questions, there is a need of an evaluation method. The 
evaluation method can be a survey, which can be asked from polluters or people who are 
affected by the regulation. Then, researcher can work on survey’s statistics and measure the 
impact of regulation on pollution.  
However, this kind of survey usually has bias and is affected by incentives of 
respondents. An econometric model can help to find better estimation of the impact of regulation 
on pollution. What are needed in an econometric model? First, a good model should include all 
variables which can affect pollution. Second, correct proxies for regulation should be used. 
Different regulation in different countries can have a special proxy. Third, an econometric model 
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needs enough data. Maybe it is easy to choose a good proxy for regulation; however, there may 
not be enough data for that, or data may exist but they are not accessible. Especially for 
regulation variables these problems are bigger; because, regulation can change year by year. This 
can make impossible to run a time-series or panel model. Fourth, a good model should be able to 
measure short term and long term effect of regulation.  
This paper starts with a literature review about the impact of regulation on pollution and 
some other variables, and the proxies which are chosen for regulation. In the second section, the 
econometric model and its Data are explained. In the third section, the results from the model are 
interpreted and compared with the literature review. In the last section, conclusion is presented 
and some suggestions are proposed to extend this research.  
Literature review 
Nowadays, environmental sustainability is a critic issue for the world, and governments 
have been working on this issue. In economics, many economists have tried to find the effect of 
governments and their regulations on environment to see how the governments can help protect 
the environment and provide a good and healthy environment for their citizens.  The author is 
inspired by Cole et al (2005) to start this paper. They looked at UK and found out the effect of 
regulations’ proxies on pollution. This work is a good try to run the same model to check the 
effect of government on decreasing air-pollution in Canada. Before and after Cole et al (2005), 
many people have worked on the effect of regulation on pollution. In this part the literature is 
reviewed. 
Hettige et al (1996) check effect of informal regulation on pollution intensity in South 
and Southeast Asia. They use “community pressure” as a measure of “informal regulation” and 
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use “income and education” as the proxies for “community pressure”.  In their econometric 
model, they include some other explanatory variables like: new technology, productivity, and 
public and foreign ownership of firms. Their source of econometric model was Pargal and 
Wheeler (1995). 
Jorgenson et al (1990) investigate effect of environmental regulation on economic growth 
of US, and Regens et al (1997) look at effect of environmental regulation on “the demand for 
pollution control equipment”. Tannenwald (1997) surveys different effect of environmental 
regulations. In his paper, he explains some measures of “regulatory stringency”. According to 
him, Bartik (1988) use “governmental spending on water quality control as a fraction of 
manufacturing employment, average for 1972–78” and “government spending on air quality 
control as a fraction of manufacturing employment, average for 1972–78” as measures of 
regulation to find the effect of regulation on “New plant location”. Also, According to 
Tannenwald (1997), Duffy-Deno (1992) use “[m]anufacturers’ air pollution abatement costs as a 
fraction of manufacturing value added” and “[m]anufacturers’ total pollution abatement costs as 
a fraction of manufacturing value added” as other measures of regulation to find the effect of 
regulation on “Manufacturing employment and earnings per capita.” Moreover, according to 
Tannenwald (1997), Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992) use “State pollution abatement 
capital expenditures as a fraction of gross state product originating in manufacturing” as a 
measure to calculate effect of regulation on “Location of foreign branch plants, by state.” 
Hettige et al (2000) say, “. . . credible indices of environmental regulation are difficult to 
find.” In an interesting research they found that “environmental Kuznets curve(EKC) 
hypothesis” is true for “industrial water pollution” in US and some other countries; in fact, 
pollution first rise with income and start to decrease after a point. According to Hettige et al 
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(2000): Hettige et al (1996), Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Wang and Wheeler (1996), Hartman et 
al (1997a,b), and McConnell (1997), also, use “per capita income” as a proxy for formal and 
informal regulation. Moreover, Berman et al (2001) use US data to measure the effect of 
environmental regulation on employment in South Coast Air Basin. One of the proxies for 
regulation, in this paper, is “budgets” that government spent on regulation. 
Antweiler et al (2001) work on relation between trade liberalization and “sulfur dioxide 
concentrations” for 43 countries. They mention that income per capita can be a measure of 
regulation; then, Cole et al (2003) start with a model for OECD countries to check the result of 
Antweiler et al (2001).  Cole et al (2003) use “sulfur dioxide emission” instead of concentrations. 
They used income per capita as a proxy for environmental regulation. They also apply “country’s 
relative capital–labor ratio” and “the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP” in their model to 
check the effect of these variables on emission and check the effect of “interaction” of these 
variables with regulation on pollution.  
Cole et al (2005) use different macro-level data for UK industries. Also, they use regional 
data for employment, ratio of dirty industries output to total output, total population, population 
under 44 years old, and income per capita as proxies for formal and informal regulation. 
Merlevede et al (2006) check the “environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis” for 45 countries. 
They add “average firm size” for each country to their model to check the effect of size on 
pollution. They find that “large firm countries” has more pollution; also, they find that if these 
countries are developed, then they have this privilege to accept regulation easier; therefore, 
development may decrease the pollution of “large firm countries.” Kathuria (2007) find an 
interesting proxy for informal regulation in Gujarat, one of the India’s states. He finds out that 
“No. of articles/decisions against the industry pertaining to water pollution” in some newspapers 
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in this state can work as a regulation instruments. Also, he finds a significant negative effect of 
this variable on water pollution for most cases. Moreover, Cole et al (2007) run the same model 
as Cole et al (2005) for China, and they find that increase in energy use and human capital 
intensity increases industrial air pollution, and increase in industrial research and development 
and productivity decreases the pollution. They check the effect of formal and informal regulation 
on emissions in China and find that regulation almost does not have significant effect on 
pollution. In this paper, author use the Cole et al (2005)’s model and check the effect of 
regulation on industrial pollution in Canada. The econometric model is presented in next section. 
The econometric model and Data 
This paper uses the same model as Cole et al (2005). According to them, demand and 
supply of pollution produce a model which shows the effect of socio-economic variables on 
pollution. In their model, pollution is a function of energy use, physical capital intensity, 
human capital intensity, average size of firms, productivity, capital expenditure, and R&D 
expenditure. Also, it includes some proxies for formal and informal regulations which use 
regional variables like:  unemployment, population density, population under 44 years old, 
production of dirty industries, and income per capita. Cole et al (2005) state: 
 
“ . . .  [W]e can summarize pollution demand and supply by defining 
an industry’s pollution demand as: 
 
݁௜௧ ൌ ݂ሺ݌௜௧, ݊௜௧, ݌ܿ݅௜௧, ݄ܿ݅௜௧, ݏ௜௧, ݐ݂݌௜௧,݉݋݀௜௧, ݅݊݊݋ݒ௜௧ሻ                                                ሺ1ሻ 
 
where, subscripts i and t denote industry and year, e denotes air emissions, p denotes 
the expected price of pollution as a result of environmental regulations, n denotes 
energy use, pci is physical capital intensity, hci is human capital intensity, s is the 
size of the average firm in the industry, tfp is the total factor productivity of the 
industry, mod is a measure of the vintage of production processes and, finally, innov 
represents innovation. . . . 
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The industry’s pollution supply schedule identifies the expected price that it will pay 
for pollution. This, in turn, is a function of the quantity of pollution and the 
stringency of formal and informal environmental regulations. 
 
݌௜௧ ൌ ݂ሺ݁௜௧, ܨܴ݁݃ݏ௜௧, ܫܴ݁݃ݏ௜௧ሻ                                                                                             ሺ2ሻ 
 
where p and e are as already defined, FRegs refers to formal environmental 
regulations, whilst IRegs refers to informal regulations. 
In equilibrium, pollution can therefore be defined as: 
 
݁௜௧ ൌ ݂ሺ݊௜௧, ݌ܿ݅௜௧, ݄ܿ݅௜௧, ݏ௜௧, ݐ݂݌௜௧,݉݋݀௜௧, ݅݊݊݋ݒ௜௧, ܨܴ݁݃ݏ௜௧, ܫܴ݁݃ݏ௜௧ሻ                     ሺ3ሻ" 
 
 
First the method of Cole et al (2005) for making formal and informal variables is 
explained; then, the variables in this paper and their sources presented. The same as Cole et al 
(2005), we use this equation below to calculated the informal and formal regulation variables.  
REGX   ୧୲ ൌ ෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ X୰୲ሻ
௥
 
Where xሺitሻ is the proxy variable for regulation for industry i in time t 
Sirt is the ratio of GDP of industry i in province r to total national GDP of industry i. 1 
Xሺrtሻ is the proxy variables for province r in time t 
In CANSIM, the data for provincial GDP was not available for 1999-2003. The data is 
imputed, because without those years’ information, Sirt=0 for those years and make regulation 
variables data for those years equal to ‘zero’. The robustness is checked before and after 
imputation. Also, because of missing value for regional GDP of Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut, those provinces are dropped from data. 
Cole et al (2005) usethis formula for “pollution prosecutions scaled by manufacturing 
output”, “regional unemployment rate” , “population density”,  “population under the age of 44”,  
                                                            
1 Cole et al (2005) use output instead of GDP. Here, I could not find the information for output. Therefore, I use 
GDP in the model.  
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“the concentration of UK dirty industries within a region.”, and “regional per capita income”. 
The data for “pollution prosecutions scaled by manufacturing output” is not available. 
According to Cole et al (2005) regions that have higher unemployment rates may have 
lower regulations; because, they have more social problems that they should consider before 
thinking about environment. Also, in the area with lower unemployment rate, people ask more 
for better environment; because, they are richer and they like to live in clean area. They 
considered unemployment as proxy for both formal and informal regulation. Cole et al (2005) 
claim that regions with larger population densities ask for more regulation. Populated regions 
need more regulation because the lives of more people are in danger. Also, they say that “a 
pollution intensive plant may be less ‘visible’ in a densely populated, urban area and hence may 
escape the attentions of the local population.” Therefore, we may see the positive relation 
between population density and pollution, in this way. This variable is a proxy for informal 
regulation. 
Population under 44 years old, according to Cole et al (2005) can have power to ask 
better environment, they are young and may have more energy to follow their request, Therefore, 
it is seen that regions with relatively younger population has more regulation to keep the air 
clean. This variable is a proxy for informal regulation. Share of dirty industries in the region is 
one of the Cole et al (2005)’s formal regulation variables. Cole et al (2005) first use “pollution 
prosecutions scaled by manufacturing output” as proxy of formal regulation, and in their 
sensitive analysis, they replace this variable with the share of dirty industries in the region.  
As the data for the pollution prosecution is not available, share of dirty industries is used 
in this work. This variable shows that the more dirty industries in the region, the more regulation 
is in an area. For finding making share of dirty industries in the region, the same as Cole et al 
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(2005), the average Greenhouse Gas emission (tonnes per thousand current dollars of 
production) during 1994-2003 for each industry are taken and then found the most 5 pollutant 
industries in Canada. (Table 1) Chemical manufacturing, food manufacturing, non-metallic 
mineral product manufacturing, transportation equipment manufacturing, and petroleum and coal 
products manufacturing are the most pollutant industries in Canada.  
Table 1: Average Greenhouse Gas emission during 1994-2003                                                           
(tonnes per thousand current dollars of production)                                                                    
industry 
Average Greenhouse Gas emission (tonnes per thousand 
current dollars of production) During 1994-2003 
Chemical manufacturing 11.29222 
Food manufacturing 9.657778 
Non-metallic mineral product manufacturing 5.212222 
Transportation equipment manufacturing 3.807778 
Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 3.167778 
Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 3.132222 
Paper manufacturing 2.114444 
Plastics and rubber products manufacturing 1.695556 
Primary metal manufacturing 1.692222 
Electrical equipment appliance and component manufacturing 1.306667 
Textile mills 0.88 
Fabricated metal product manufacturing 0.7655556 
Computer and electronic product manufacturing 0.6777778 
Wood product manufacturing 0.6433333 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.6044444 
Leather and allied product manufacturing 0.5888889 
Printing and related support activities 0.5611111 
Machinery manufacturing 0.5188889 
Furniture and related product manufacturing 0.4877778 
Clothing manufacturing 0.4855556 
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Income per capita is another variable that they use in their paper as a proxy for informal 
regulation. Richer people ask for more regulation to keep their area clean. The data for income 
per capita is not available for some years, therefore, the effect of this variable does not check in 
this paper.  
Energy use, physical capital intensity, human capital intensity, average size of firms, 
productivity, capital expenditure, and R&D expenditure are the other variables that are used in 
this paper. According to Cole et al (2005), more use of energy means more pollution. More 
physical capital means more machinery which means more pollution that those industries whose 
input is just labour. Industries with higher human capital can increase pollution; because, they 
can form industries with high technology that usually use pollution-intensive machinery. From 
other side, educated people may use better the technology and produce less pollution. More 
“output” means more pollution, therefore, industries with higher average size, predicted to have 
more pollution; also, because of economy of scale “we may expect this relationship to be 
diminishing at the margin.”  
More productive industries and more innovative industries expect to pollute less; 
because, productive in one way means to have less waste and therefore less pollution, and the 
new technologies try to be more environmental friendly. Also, more capital expenditure means 
more new technology and means more environmental friendly technology too. Table 2 includes 
the variables2 which is used in this work and the variables which Cole et al (2005) use.  
 
 
 
                                                            
2 Source of these variables can be found in Appendix 1. Also Appendix 2 presents a summary statistics. 
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Table 2: definitions of variables and their equivalent in Cole et al (2005) 
variables comments equivalence  in Cole et al (2005) 
ܧ௜௧ Direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions - I aggregated them 
into 2-digit NAICS (tonnes per thousand current dollars of 
production) 
" Emissions divided by gross value added " 
௜ܰ௧ fossil_fuel use /manufacturing value added  (gigajoules/ $ 1000 ) " Energy use divided by gross value added " 
ܲܥܫ௜௧ manufacturing value added  / number of total employees ($/ person) “Physical capital intensity: Non-wage value added per worker 
((VA-payroll)/employees)” 
ܪܥܫ௠௔௡௙ ௜௧ • average industrial wage/average manufacturing wage  ($ 1000/ $ 
1000)                                                                    • average industrial 
wage = total wages/total employees for each industry  ($1000 / 
person)                        
• average manufacturing wage = total wages/total employees for 
whole manufacturing industries  ($1000 / person)                        
" An industry’s wage rate relative to the average 
manufacturing sector’s wage " 
ܵܫܼܧ௜௧ manufacturing value added  / number of establishments  ($ 1000 / 
unit) 
" Value added per firm " 
ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ the same as its source (index, 2002=100 unless otherwise noted) " Total factor productivity " 
ܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ Capital expenditure / manufacturing value added  ( $ 1000 000 
current prices /  $ 1000 000) 
" Capital expenditure divided by value added " 
ܴܦ௜௧ business R&D/manufacturing value added  ($/$) " Research and development expenditure divided by value 
added " 
௜ܵ௥௧  sirt= Regional GDP / industrial GDP ( $ 1000 000 /  $ 1000 000) 
( this data is imputed for 1999-2003) 
"s is the output of industry i in region r as a share of total 
national output of industry i" 
 
ܴܧܩ ௗ௜௥௧௠௔௡௙ ௜௧ 
 
෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ provinceᇱs share of Canadian dirty productionሻ
௥
 
• provinceᇱs share of Canadian dirty production = sum of 
productions of 5 pollutant industries in each province / sum of 
productions of 5 pollutant industries in Canada   
( $ 1000 000 /  $ 1000 000) 
 
෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ a region’s share of UK dirty productionሻ
௥
 
"a region’s share of UK dirty production, where dirty 
production is classed as the production from five of the most 
pollution intensive industries " 
ܴܧܩ௉ௗ ௜௧ 
෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ provincial population densityሻ
௥
 
 
• provincial population density =population/area (person/ km2) 
 
෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ regional population densityሻ
௥
 
 
 
ܴܧܩ௨௡௘௠௣ ௜௧ 
  ෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ provincial unemployment rateሺ%ሻሻ
௥
 ෍ሺS୧୰୲ ൈ  regional unemployment rateሻ
௥
 
ܴܧܩ௔௚௘௣௢௣ ௜௧ 
෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ provincial share of population under the age of 44ሻ
௥
 ෍ሺS୧୰୲ ൈ regional share of population under 44ሻ
௥
 
ܴܧܩ௉஼௒ ௜௧ 
෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ provincial per capita income ሺ$ሻሻ
௥
 
 
෍ሺS୧୰୲  ൈ regional per capita incomeሻ
௥
 
 
Cole et al (2005) use the model A: 
 
ܧ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߚଶܲܥܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܪܥܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜௧ 
൅ߚହܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܦ௜௧ ൅ ߣᇱܴܧܩ ൅ ߝ௜௧    ሺܣሻ 
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This model is simple panel model and can be used when there is no ‘unit root’ problem. 
However, the variables have unit roots. Moreover, after ‘cointegration test’, it is found that there 
is cointegration; therefore, ‘Vector Error Correction Model’ (VECM) can be used. VECM show 
the short run and long run effects of variables. The main econometric model is model B: 
∆ܧ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ܧ௜௧ିଵ  ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߚଶܲܥܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܪܥܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚହܶܨ ௜ܲ௧
൅ ߚ଺ܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܦ௜௧ ൅ ߣᇱܴܧܩ ൅ ߚ଼∆ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߚଽ∆ܲܥܫ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴∆ܪܥܫ௜௧     ሺܤሻ  
൅ ߚଵଵ∆ܵܫܼܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵଶ∆ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚଵଷ∆ܥܣ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚଵସ∆ܴܦ௜௧ ൅ ߛᇱ∆ܴܧܩ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ∆ ௜ܺ௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ െ ௜ܺ௧ିଵ.
3 
The model is a Random effect model; because ‘Breusch-pagan test’ shows that the model 
is a panel instead of pool. Also, ‘Hausman test’ shows that random effect model should be used 
instead of fixed effect model. Next section is discussed the results. 
 
Result 
Long run elasticity for variables calculated the same as Acharya & Coulumbe (2006). For 
variable X, They ‘divide the estimated coefficient for X by the opposite of estimated coefficient 
for lagged dependent variable to find the long run elasticity of variable X’. Most of the variables 
of this study have significant effect on pollution in Canada. Table 3 show the econometric 
results. First the long run effects of variables are interpreted; then, the short run effects are 
explained.  
The result of regression 1, with and without imputation, is in table 3. The sign of 
variables in two regressions are almost the same, however, more data is available with 
imputation; therefore, the coefficients are more significant. 
 
                                                            
3 The coefficient behind the ∆ ௜ܺ௧ explains the short run effect of change in variables X on pollution. 
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Table 3: Econometric results 
variables (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
D1.emission 
VEC Long 
Run 
elasticity 
GLS VEC 
Without 
imputation for 
regional GDP 
L1.emission -0.70 
(0.06) 
 
 
-0.70 
(0.00) 
-0.95 
(0.04) 
energy -0.03 
(0.88) 
 
insignificant 
-0.03 
(0.65) 
-0.15 
(0.61) 
PCI 0.72 
(0.03) 
1.03 
 
0.72 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.49) 
HCImanf 1.40 
(0.03) 
2.01 
 
1.40 
(0.00) 
0.63 
(0.69) 
SIZE -0.61 
(0.04) 
-0.87 
 
-0.61 
(0.00) 
-0.61 
(0.24) 
MFP 0.39 
(0.24) 
insignificant 
 
0.39 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.84) 
CAP 0.01 
(0.95) 
insignificant 
 
-0.00 
(0.859) 
-0.20 
(0.44) 
R&D -0.07 
(0.55) 
insignificant 
 
-0.07 
0.070 
-0.073 
(0.67) 
REGpd 2.50 
(0.00) 
3.57 
 
2.50 
(0.00) 
1.03 
(0.47) 
REGunemp 1.45 
(0.07) 
2.06 
 
1.48 
(0.00) 
0.62 
(0.42) 
REGagepop -3.62 
(0.00) 
-5.16 
 
-3.62 
(0.00) 
-1.41 
(0.26) 
REGdirtmanf -0.76 
(0.05) 
-1.08 
 
-0.76 
(0.00) 
-0.40 
(0.59) 
D1.energy 0.36 
(0.03) 
Short run effect 
൅
0.36 
(0.00) 
0.016 
(0.96) 
D1.PCI -0.28 
(0.30) 
insignificant 
 
-0.28 
(0.002) 
-0.55 
(0.20) 
D1.HCImanf -1.76 
(0.00) 
Short run effect 
െ 
 
-1.76 
(0.00) 
-1.52 
(0.12) 
D1.SIZE 0.56 
(0.18) 
insignificant 
 
0.56 
(0.00) 
0.67 
(0.36) 
D1.MFP -0.65 
(0.08) 
Short run effect 
െ 
 
-0.65 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.61) 
D1.CAP -0.02 
(0.84) 
insignificant 
 
-0.02 
(0.55) 
0.03 
(0.88) 
D1.R&D -0.08 
(0.34) 
insignificant 
 
-0.076 
(0.004) 
0.06 
(0.623) 
D1.REGpd -1.59 
(0.00) 
Short run effect 
െ 
 
-1.59 
(0.00) 
-0.73 
(0.24) 
D1.REGunemp -0.79 
(0.16) 
insignificant 
 
-0.79 
(0.00) 
-0.39 
(0.44) 
D1.REGagepop 1.99 
(0.02) 
Short run effect 
൅ 
 
1.99 
(0.00) 
0.84 
(0.24) 
D1.REGdirtmanf 0.58 
(0.00) 
Short run effect 
൅ 
 
0.58 
(0.00) 
0.31 
(0.34) 
                            The value in paranthesis are P-value. 
 
In long run increase in physical capital intensity has a positive effect on direct and 
indirect greenhouse gas emissions. One percent increase in physical capital intensity increases 
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1.03 percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions. More physical capital means more 
machinery which means more pollution that those industries whose input is just labour. Also, in 
long run, an increase in human capital increases pollution; because, they can form industries with 
high technology that usually use pollution-intensive machinery. One percent increase in human 
capital intensity increases 2.01 percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions. 
Furthermore, increase in the average size of industries has a negative effect on pollution because 
of economy of scale. Bigger firms can control pollution better; therefore, one percent increase in 
average size of firms decrease 0.87 percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions.  
According to Cole et al (2005), “a pollution intensive plant may be less ‘visible’ in a 
densely populated, urban area and hence may escape the attentions of the local population.” 
Therefore, there might be positive relation between population density and pollution. Table 3 
suggests that one percent increase in informal regulation through population density increase 
3.57 percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions. It can be, also, said that people like to 
live in polluted area because there are more job in those areas. Table 3 suggests that one percent 
increase in formal and informal regulation through unemployment rate increase 2.06 percent 
direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions.  
According to Cole et al (2005) regions that have more unemployment rate may have 
lower regulations; because, they have more social problems that they should consider before 
thinking about environment. Also, in the area with lower unemployment rate, people ask more 
for better environment; because they are richer and they like to live in clean area. Population 
under 44 years old, according to Cole et al (2005) can have more power to ask better 
environment, they are young and may have more energy to follow their request, Therefore, it is 
seen that provinces with relatively younger has more regulation to keep the air clean. One 
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percent increase in informal regulation through population under 44 years old decreases 5.16 
percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions.  
Also, one percent increase in formal regulation through provincial share of Canadian 
dirty production decreases 1.08 percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions. This 
variable shows that the more dirty industries in a province, the more regulations are in for area. 
Therefore, it could possible to have more pollution prosecutions and firms avoid polluting 
because of those regulation and pollution prosecutions.  
In short run, more use of energy causes more pollution. Educated people use technology 
efficiently and produce less pollution. Also, more productive industries and more innovative 
industries expect to pollute less; because, productive in one way means to have less waste and 
therefore less pollution, and the new technologies try to be more environmental friendly. 
Industries with larger population density have more informal regulation. Populated regions need 
more regulation because the lives of more people are in danger. In short run the effect of this 
informal regulation variable is negative on direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions.  
It is observed that industries in area with younger population, in short run, cause more 
pollution. More younger population cause more jobs and more production in those areas and it 
may cause increase in pollution in short run. Moreover, Provincial share of Canadian dirty 
production, the proxy for formal regulation, in short run increases direct and indirect greenhouse 
gas emissions. It can be said that dirty industries in short run increase pollution, however, in long 
run, formal regulation like pollution prosecution decrease their incentives to pollute. In general, 
the result of this model in Canada confirms the result of Hettige (1996), Cole et al (2005), and 
Cole et al (2007). 
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Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of formal and informal regulations on pollution intensity on 
Canadian industries. The econometrics model is a panel with 23 manufacturing industries over 
10 years, from 1994 to 2003. In this study, pollution is a function of energy use, physical capital 
intensity, human capital intensity, average size of firms, productivity, capital expenditure, and 
R&D expenditure. Moreover, proxies for formal and informal regulations include 
unemployment, population density, population under 44 years old, and production of dirty 
industries. 
Most of the variables of this study have significant effect on pollution in Canada. An 
increase in physical capital intensity has a positive effect on direct and indirect greenhouse gas 
emissions in long run such that one percent increase in physical capital intensity increases 1.03 
percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions. An increase in human capital increases 
pollution in the long run. One percent increase in human capital intensity increases 2.01 percent 
direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, increase in the average size of 
industries has a negative effect on pollution such that one percent increase in average size of 
firms decreases 0.87 percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, one 
percent increase in informal regulation through population density increases 3.57 percent direct 
and indirect greenhouse gas emissions, one percent increase in formal and informal regulation 
through unemployment rate increase 2.06 percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions, 
one percent increase in informal regulation through population under 44 years old decreases 5.16 
percent direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions, and one percent increase in formal 
regulation through provincial share of Canadian dirty production decreases 1.08 percent direct 
and indirect greenhouse gas emissions in the long run. Short-run effects of variables have been 
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also estimated. In general, this paper suggests that formal and informal regulations have 
significant effects in reducing direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions in Canada. This study 
confirms the result of Hettige (1996), Cole et al (2005), and Cole et al (2007). This study on 
Canadian industries can be improved if new data is captured for variables such as pollution 
prosecution and income per capita for provinces in Canada.  
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Appendix 1: Source of data 
variable description source: 
emission Direct and 
indirect 
greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
153-0033 - Direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions (carbon 
dioxide equivalents), by industry, L-level aggregation, annual (tonnes 
per thousand current dollars of production) 
fossil_fuel Energy fuel 
consumption 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
128-00061 Energy fuel consumption of manufacturing industries in 
gigajoules, by North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS), annual 
manu_va_1000 Manufacturing 
value added 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM):Table 
301-0003 - Annual survey of manufactures (ASM), principal statistics 
by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 
incorporated businesses with employees having sales of manufactured 
goods greater than or equal to $30,000 (dollars unless 
totalemployees total employees Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM):Table 
301-0003 - Annual survey of manufactures (ASM), principal statistics 
by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 
incorporated businesses with employees having sales of manufactured 
goods greater than or equal to $30,000 (dollars unless 
induwage total salaries and 
wage per 
industry 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
301-0003 - Annual survey of manufactures (ASM), principal statistics 
by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 
incorporated businesses with employees having sales of manufactured 
goods greater than or equal to $30,000 (dollars unless 
manufwage Total salaries 
and wages (x 
1,000) 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
301-0003 - Annual survey of manufactures (ASM), principal statistics 
by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 
incorporated businesses with employees having sales of manufactured 
goods greater than or equal to $30,000 (dollars unless 
number_of_establishm
ents 
number of 
establishments 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
301-0003 - Annual survey of manufactures (ASM), principal statistics 
by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 
incorporated businesses with employees having sales of manufactured 
goods greater than or equal to $30,000 (dollars unless 
mfp_based_VA Multifactor 
productivity 
based on Value 
added 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
383-0022 - Multifactor productivity, gross output, value-added, 
capital, labour and intermediate inputs at a detailed industry level, by 
North American Industry Classification System 
cap_exp_current_price
s 
Capital 
expenditure 
(current price) 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
031-0002 - Flows and stocks of fixed non-residential capital, by North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), annual (dollars x 
1,000,000) 
business_rd_x_10000
00 
Business R&D  Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
358-0024 - Business enterprise research and development (BERD) 
characteristics, by industry group based on the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS), annual (dollars unless 
otherwise noted) 
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unemploy unemployment 
rate in each 
province 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
282-0055 - Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by provinces, 
territories and economic regions, annual (persons unless otherwise 
noted) 
population population in 
each province 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
051-0001 - Estimates of population, by age group and sex, Canada, 
provinces and territories, annual (persons) 
area area for each 
province 
source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_provinces_and_territo
ries_by_area 
age44 population by 
age group (0-44) 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
051-0001 - Estimates of population, by age group and sex, Canada, 
provinces and territories, annual (persons) 
regional_gdp Provincial GDP 
per industry 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
379-00251,25,26 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at basic prices, by 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and 
province, annual (dollars x 1 000 000) 
GDP_industry GDP for each 
industry in 
canada 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
379-00251,25,26 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at basic prices, by 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and 
province, annual (dollars x 1 000 000) 
income_percapita income per 
capita 
Statistics Canada's key socio-economic database (CANSIM): Table 
111-0009 - Family characteristics, summary, annual 
 
 
Appendix 2: summary statistics 
variables 
# of 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
emissions 180 2.46 3.04 0.34 14.91 
energy 187 9.77 23.14 0.01 155.36 
PCI 210 65775.69 58107.61 12614.78 415715.70
HCImanf 210 0.99 0.26 0.54 1.62 
SIZE 210 7395.94 7586.65 857.37 33528.22 
MFP 200 93.70 12.75 65.60 178.40 
CAP 200 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.42 
R&D 170 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.45 
REGdirtyma~m 230 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.46 
REGpop_im 230 6.74 3.92 0.00 22.84 
REGunem_im 230 6.31 3.46 0.00 16.01 
REGagepop_im 230 0.50 0.27 0.00 1.33 
 
 
